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Abstract 
The return of failed asylum seekers is an integral part of each state’s migration manage-
ment policy and border control. However such returns must be balanced by respect for hu-
man rights. This is especially pertinent in a time when the Norwegian government has 
made it a major focus of policy to step up their effort to return failed asylum seekers. The 
purpose of this thesis has therefore been to analyze what the responsibilities of the Norwe-
gian government are towards failed asylum seekers who are forcefully returned. In answer-
ing this question, it has been argued for the existence of an extraterritorial obligation to 
investigate allegations of ill-treatment in the post-return phase. Several dilemmas and chal-
lenges present itself in this phase, lack of knowledge being one of them, another being the 
lack of priority from the political government in Norway. Additionally it seems that the 
mechanisms put in place function more as a ‘warning’ sign, than actual protection of the 
returnee. It concludes that the responsibilities ensure the protection of the failed asylum 
seeker to a certain degree, but there is a lack of information about the effects of the return. 
It has, therefore, become apparent that the government can do more to protect failed asy-
lum seekers.  
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 1 
1 Introduction   
1.1 Background 
Rahim Rostami came from Iran to Norway in search of protection from persecution. His 
application for asylum was rejected and he was asked to return. Rahim did not return vol-
untarily and was therefore returned by force. The Norwegian police handed Rahim over to 
the Iranian police at the airport in Teheran. He was held at the airport for two days before 
he was transferred to Evin prison where he was tortured. Rahim was released after four 
months and was then accused of oppositional activities and violations of Sharia law; the 
latter being the reason for his flight to Norway and the basis of his asylum application.
1
 
However, the facts of his case are highly contested, which makes it challenging to come to 
a solution or a remedy for the alleged human rights violations in this case.
2
 
 
At present it seems to be unclear, for the Norwegian government, what happens to many 
failed asylum seekers after the return has been implemented and the person has reached 
what is here called the post-return phase. There exists no mechanism for monitoring the 
post-return phase, nor is protection in this phase included explicitly in the regulations of 
forced return.
3
 Thus, whether failed asylum seekers are returned to torture or ill-treatment 
is therefore unknown in most cases. Consequently, there is a need to study legal provisions 
relating to the post-return phase.  
 
The return of failed asylum seekers is an integral part of each state’s migration manage-
ment policy and border control. However such returns must be balanced by respect for hu-
man rights. This is especially pertinent in a time when the Norwegian government has 
                                                 
 
1
 Steen, 2013:222-223,  Heinesen, 2011,   
2
 Opsahl, 2011, UNE, 2011 
3
 Return Directive from 2008 on common standards and procedures in member states of the EU for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals (Return Directive) 
 2 
made it a major focus of policy to step up their effort to return
4
 failed asylum seekers, and 
has set specific removal targets they aim to achieve. The Norwegian government has allo-
cated additional funding for the police to be able to forcefully return 6700 failed asylum 
seekers in 2014, a remarkable increase from 2013.
5
 It is therefore important that the gov-
ernment will manage to protect those who are in real need of protection and return those 
who do not need protection.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore to investigate what, if any, obligations the Norwe-
gian government has towards failed asylum seekers in the post-return phase. The research 
question is therefore:  
 
What are the responsibilities of the Norwegian government towards failed asylum seekers 
who are forcefully returned, and will these responsibilities ensure the protection of the 
failed asylum seeker in the post-return phase? 
 
1.2 Definitions 
By focusing on failed asylum seekers, it is important to know who is a refugee, and who is 
not. Therefore an overview is necessary, first of the refugee definition and then of the defi-
nition of a failed asylum seeker.       
 
The refugee definition in the Norwegian Immigration Act
6
 derives from the 1951 Conven-
tion relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), but has a wider scope as it 
                                                 
 
4
 Extradition, expulsion, deportation and return are terms which are often used interchangeably. Return is a 
broad term which covers the different types of acts of removing a person from one country to another, and 
will mostly be used in this thesis. When the person has returned, he or she will be called a returnee. 
5
Press release Nr.:109 -2013, In 2013 PU returned 5934 persons in total, where 1 270 returned to their home 
country, 1 400 returned to another Dublin country and the rest were expelled. Forfang, 2014 and PU, 2013 
6
 Act of 15 May 2008 on the entry of foreign nationals into the kingdom of Norway and their stay in the realm 
(Immigration Act). 
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includes a second group, presented in paragraph (b), of persons traditionally receiving 
complimentary protection under human rights law. According to § 28(a) of the Immigration 
Act, a person shall be recognized as a refugee if the foreign national has a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or for reasons of political opinion, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of origin. Fur-
ther, paragraph (b) of § 28 states that if the person do not fall within the scope of (a) but 
nevertheless still face a real risk of being subjected to a death penalty, torture or other in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to his or her country of origin, 
the person will be recognized as a refugee. If a person is not recognized as a refugee ac-
cording to § 28(a) or (b),
7
 he or she will be referred to as a failed asylum seeker.  
 
A failed asylum seeker is any third country national, coming from outside the Schengen 
area, which holds a return decision.
8
 The return decision means in practice that the applica-
tion for asylum was rejected and that the person must leave the country and the whole 
Schengen area within a given deadline, usually within a couple of weeks.
9
 If a person fails 
to comply with the order to leave Norway, or the government suspects that the person will 
fail to return by himself, the police may intervene and escort the person out of the country; 
this is when the return process starts.
10
  
 
                                                 
 
7
 According to § 38 of the Immigration Act, UDI must also consider whether he or she should be granted 
residence on humanitarian grounds after § 38 of the Immigration Act, however this provision will not be 
given much attention in this thesis. 
8
 Return Directive, article 2 
9
 NOAS, 2013:7, Article 11 of the Return Directive states that the return decision shall be accompanied with 
an entry ban, for example: “ (b) if the obligation to return has not been complied with”, which will include 
affect persons who are returned by force.  
10
 Return Directive, article 8. Dublin cases will not be looked at in this thesis. 
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1.3 The Norwegian asylum system 
As an introduction to the issues addressed in the analysis of this thesis, a brief presentation 
over the options a failed asylum seeker has to appeal and set aside the return decision will 
be made here. Additionally the return process, or in other words the removal of a person 
from Norway to another country, will be introduced to present the institutions making up 
the Norwegian asylum system and how they work.  
 
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security has the overall responsibility for return of 
failed asylum seekers, while the Norwegian Directorate for Immigration (UDI) has the re-
sponsibility for coordinating the immigration administration in Norway. Further, Landinfo 
is the Norwegian Country of Origin Center for Information, and provides the other institu-
tions with updated information about the asylum seekers home country, used as one of the 
sources for assessing the risks of return.
11
 Before the return process starts, the asylum seek-
er will receive a return decision, given by UDI. Thereafter the asylum seeker will have the 
opportunity to appeal this decision to the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE), according to 
the Immigration Act § 76. UNE can also set aside its previous decision as long as this is in 
relation to the foreigner's advantage, as stated in § 35 of the Public Administration Act. 
There are no further restrictions on how many decisions UNE can set aside.
12
 Although, 
UNE has no duty to conduct a new assessment of the decision, unless the request for as-
sessments concerns non-refoulement, in other words the protection against return.  
 
Moreover, there are three different ways to organize a return from Norway; assisted, ac-
companied and forced return. UDI is responsible for providing a program of assisted return. 
Others may be accompanied by the Police Immigration Service (PU) to facilitate the return, 
which is called accompanied return. Both the assisted and accompanied return option will 
provide the returnee the opportunity of applying for return and reintegration support 
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through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), commissioned by UDI, and is 
often called voluntary return.
13
 Whether accompanied return is necessary or not, will be 
assessed by UDI in consultation with PU.
14
 Further, PU will implement the forced return of 
failed asylum seekers who do not return voluntarily.  
 
A number of the forced returns from Norway are carried out on ordinary scheduled flights, 
where a small number of persons are escorted by police officers from PU. In other cases 
PU uses their own chartered airplanes for a larger number of returnees. PU can also coop-
erate with FRONTEX, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Coopera-
tion at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, where the air-
plane will make stops in several European countries before proceeding to the destination 
outside the Schengen area.
15
 Furthermore, article 8(6) of the Return Directive, requires that 
states shall provide for an effective forced-return monitoring system of all the phases of the 
return process, from the person is picked up by the police until he or she reaches the coun-
try of origin.
16
 However, no indication is provided as to what mechanisms are to be put in 
place for states to comply with this obligation. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
in Norway initiated in 2012 a hearing of guidelines for monitoring forced return. By the 
end of the year it was informed that the new policy would be ready in the beginning of 
2013.
17
  Though, in light of the fact that FRONTEX initiated a process of making a code of 
conduct, the guidelines were delayed. During the negotiations there was a difficulty in 
agreeing upon a common standard for use of force by all EU member states. FRONTEX 
did therefore refer back to article 8(6) of the Return Directive.
18
 What can be seen from this 
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is that each country will have to interpret what this means in practice and make the condi-
tions for what the monitoring bodies should and should not react on. Thus, the ministry is 
still undecided on how they will implement a system of monitoring the forced return. How-
ever, in other EU countries, National Preventative Mechanisms (NPMs)
19
 have been au-
thorized to accompany irregular migrants during flights since 2011, which makes it possi-
ble to see whether the returnees are treated humanely and according to the regulations ap-
plicable. Nevertheless, they stop to monitor once the returnee has been handed over to the 
authorities of the country of origin, since escort personnel and supervisory bodies do not 
have a mandate to go beyond this point at the present time.
20
 
 
Therefore, when a failed asylum seeker reaches the country of origin, there is a transfer 
before the post-return phase starts. The transfer phase is the most critical phase of the re-
turn process, as it is often during the transfer that that the greatest risk of ill-treatment oc-
curs, due to the use of coercive measures by the parties involved.
21
 After the transfer has 
been made, the failed asylum seeker enters the post-return phase. The Return Directive 
regulates the return process but is silent about the responsibilities of the sending state in the 
post-return phase, which is particularly interesting for the questions raised in this study. 
 
Moreover, NPMs in EU have noted that conditions on arrival are very difficult; they are 
often rejected by the local population or their family, and live in total isolation. The Com-
mittee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons in EU, therefore argue that this rep-
resents a legal vacuum that needs to be filled.
22
 As such, the post-return phase and the legal 
responsibilities of the sending state will be addressed in this thesis. 
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1.4 Methodology 
In view of the complexity of the issue at hand, there is a need to use a multidisciplinary 
approach, where law and practice are combined together. This thesis is based on the legal 
tradition referred to as law in context, an approach where the starting point are problems in 
society which are likely to be generalized. In this approach law may provide a solution to 
the problem, but other non-law solutions are not excluded and may also be preferred.  This 
is in contrast to the legal tradition of black-letter law, which places the main focus on the 
law itself as an internal self-sustaining set of principles.
23
 Multidisciplinary research can 
broaden the legal discourse in terms of its theoretical and conceptual framework, and it is 
therefore chosen as a research methodology.
24
 
 
Two methods of data collection have been used in this study: the examination of 
documents and conducting interviews with related actors in the field. As such, this study 
has primarily been a qualitative desk-study, supplemented with a few interviews. In the 
examination of documents, primary legal sources, de lege lata, being treaties, customary 
law, general principles of law and judicial decisions have been analyzed. The study of these 
documents have been in accordance with article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice and article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
relating to the interpretation of treaties. Relevant Norwegian and regional legislation, such 
as the Immigration Act and the Return Directive, will be studied to better understand the 
legal framework regulating the forced return of asylum seekers. Additionally, international 
and regional human rights treaties will be analyzed, and a few remarks about its role in the 
legal framework in Norway will be made here.  
 
The Norwegian Constitution, § 110(c), states that it is the responsibility of the authorities 
of the state to respect and ensure human rights. The Human Rights Act is a further 
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 McConville and Chui, 2007:1 
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realization of this paragraph with the aim of strengthening the status of human rights in 
Norwegian law, and § 3 of the Immigration Act provides that the law shall be applied in 
accordance with international law, which Norway is signatory to, when these are intended 
to strengthen the position of the individual. The main human rights treaty in this study is 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), were 
especially article 3 has been analyzed in depth. The Refugee Convention and the 
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(CAT) will further be important for the study of the protection of failed asylum seekers. 
Additionally, relevant international jurisprudence and soft law instruments have been used 
to better understand the duties embedded in the different articles in the treaties. Broadly 
stated, international law defines the legal responsibilities of states in their conduct with 
each other, and their treatment of individuals within their jurisdiction. Different treaties 
may create different treaty body regimes to encourage the parties to abide by their 
obligations and undertake actions required for compliance. One such example is the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is only mandated to interpret possible 
breaches under the ECHR and not other international treaty provisions.
25
 
 
The secondary sources used in this thesis have been academic articles, reports by civil soci-
ety, regional and international organizations, press releases by government institutions and 
newspaper articles. All sources are used in their capacity, in other words according to their 
reliability and validity as such. In addition, key actors have been interviewed by using an 
informal interview guide.
26
 The aim behind conducting interviews was to find information 
about the situation of failed asylum seekers and mechanisms working to protect them, es-
pecially since there is a lack of public available information on the latter. Actors from both 
the state and civil society have been interviewed, which was particularly valuable to clarify 
the different viewpoints from the actors involved.  
                                                 
 
25
 ECHR article 32 
26
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This thesis will largely be based on qualitative judgments built on the collected data. Thus, 
it will be influenced by my personal predispositions. The information and conclusions of 
this thesis have therefore been crosschecked by the use of multiple research procedures and 
sources to improve the quality of the study, which have been elaborated on in this section.  
1.5 Reader’s guide 
To properly address the main research question, chapter 2 introduces the principle of non-
refoulement, and seeks to illustrate the meaning of the protection against return. The chap-
ter provides an insight into issues that need to be addressed before the return is implement-
ed, to be able to ensure the protection after the return has taken place, focusing on the role 
of the general security situation in the home country. Chapter 3 moves on to explore 
whether there exists a legal duty to investigate allegations of ill-treatment in the post-return 
phase, to study the responsibilities of the state after the return has been implemented. Chap-
ter 4 will analyze information about life after return, highlighting a few research projects 
conducted, to better understand what it can look like. Thereafter a case will be presented, 
concerning forced return to Eritrea, to study how Landinfo work to collect information, 
being the primary source of information for objective evidence in an asylum case. As such, 
the chapter aims to analyze whether research and information collected on general trends, 
can tell if the responsibilities presented in chapter 2 are protecting the failed asylum seeker 
in the post-return phase or not. Chapter 5 introduces four mechanisms that are put in place 
by the Norwegian government to ensure the protection of the failed asylum seeker in the 
post-return phase. Specifically, it highlights positive actions taken by the government, and 
their practical effects towards the protection of failed asylum seekers. This is seen in rela-
tion to an example of the transfer of prisoners in Afghanistan, where a few lessons may be 
learned in relation to the mechanisms discussed and the value of collecting information. 
Chapter 6 offers a brief conclusion. 
 
 
 10 
2 Before the return  
The Refugee Convention does not specify the requirements for refugee status determination 
procedures, as the idea was that state parties would establish appropriate procedures in re-
gard to the particular legal traditions in their respective country.
27
 There is in other words a 
high margin of appreciation for states to decide who should, and who should not, be pro-
tected from return.  
 
This chapter focuses on the human rights responsibilities of the Norwegian government to 
protect the asylum seeker. Firstly, this chapter will address the travaux preparatoires of the 
immigration act to study the protection against indiscriminate violence in Norwegian law. 
Secondly, the meaning and scope of the principle of non-refoulement will be addressed. 
Thereafter, the protection against return, embedded in article 3 of the ECHR and the three 
requirements for making such a case will be addressed. Lastly, this chapter looks at the 
principle of proportionality in relation to the protection embedded in the principle of non-
refoulement.  
2.1 Travaux Prèparatoires of the Immigration Act  
The EU Qualification Directive, a part of the Common European Asylum System, is not 
legally binding upon Norway, but the Directive was important in the preparatory work of 
the Immigration Act in Norway. The Committee, working on the new Immigration Act, 
argued that the Qualification Directive appeared to be a suitable basis for the formulation 
of detailed rules and that it was smart for Norway to apprehend the same policy in this area 
as most of the other European countries.
28
  
 
Article 2 of the Qualification Directive states that a person who does not qualify as a refu-
gee, but who would still face a real risk of suffering serious harm, as defined in article 15, 
would be eligible for subsidiary protection. Article 15 further defines the legal concept of 
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serious harm for the purpose of establishing who is eligible for subsidiary protection. Three 
harms are referred to: (a) death penalty or execution; (b) torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious or individual 
threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of in-
ternational or internal armed conflict. Of these, article 15(c) is of particular importance for 
the discussion in this chapter.  
 
In the Elgafaji case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) looked at the inter-
pretation of article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The case concerned an Iraqi couple 
who submitted application for temporary residence permits in the Netherlands. The CJEU 
held that article 15(b) of the Directive corresponds in essence to article 3 of the ECHR. By 
contrast article 15(c) is a provision: “the content of which is different from that of Article 3 
of the ECHR, and the interpretation of which must, therefore, be carried out independently, 
although with due regard of fundamental rights, as they are guaranteed under the ECHR.”29 
Further, the CJEU held that article 15(a) and (b) cover situations where the applicant would 
face a specific type of harm and that article 15(c) covers situations where a more general 
risk of harm exists. This case and especially the interpretation of article 15(c) have started a 
debate about the use of paragraph (c) and the reasoning given by CJEU. 
 
 In Norway, the Committee working on the Immigration Act chose not to include article 
15(c) because this paragraph was seen to be included in article 3 of the ECHR, and there-
fore already a part of section 28(b). The meaning of article 15(c) in the Qualification Di-
rective was then seen to be superfluous in the Immigration Act. The Committee further 
argued that any situation where it is shown that a person risk becoming a victim of indis-
criminate violence or designated victim of ill-treatment, would be protected by article 3 of 
the ECHR. It is further worth noting that the Immigration Act in Sweden and Finland in-
clude a paragraph equivalent to article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, and in the pre-
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 CJEU, Meki Elgafaju and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie. 17.02.2009 para 28 
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paratory work, UDI, Norwegian Helsinki Committee and the Norwegian Refugee Council, 
argued that the Immigration Act should include this paragraph.
30
 Whether the act of includ-
ing this paragraph would provide better protection or not, will not be discussed here. Ra-
ther, in the rest of this chapter the law as it is today, de lege lata, will be addressed, and 
therefore the emphasis will be put on article 3 of the ECHR, as was argued for in the pre-
paratory work of the Immigration Act. Though, first, the principle of non-refoulement will 
be addressed.  
2.2 Principle of non-refoulement 
The principle of non-refoulement is broadly seen as a provision for protection against re-
turn.
31
 This principle consists of two main aspects. The first is non-refoulement as a con-
cept which prohibits states from returning refugees or asylum seekers to territories where 
there is a risk that his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The second 
is non-refoulement as a concept of human rights concerning the prohibition of torture, cru-
el, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
32
 most commonly referred to as com-
plimentary protection.
33
 A brief analysis of these two concepts will be presented focusing 
on the treaty base of the principle; first the Refugee Convention, and second, the human 
rights concept of non-refoulement embedded in CAT and the ECHR. Thereafter a brief 
look at the common feature of the principle of non-refoulement will be provided.   
2.2.1 Treaty basis for non-refoulement 
2.2.1.1 Refugee Convention 
The principle of non-refoulement originates in article 33 of the Refugee Convention.
 
This 
article states that “states are obliged not to expel or return a refugee in any manner whatso-
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32
 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2001:1 
33
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ever to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.” The final element of this article is referred to as the qualifying phrase, character-
izing the nature of the threat. However, what if life or freedom is threatened on account of 
other reasons than those specified in article 33(1)? This may particularly be a challenge 
when the flight of the refugee is caused by a situation of indiscriminate violence in the 
country of origin. However, legal text adopted after 1951 set out the threat considered 
without qualification. One example is the Cartagena Declaration from 1984 which include 
in addition to the elements in the Refugee Convention: generalized violence, foreign ag-
gression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which 
have seriously disturbed public order.
34
 Additionally the Executive Committee of the Unit-
ed Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has in a number of conclusions 
referred to persecution without specifying the qualifying phrase.
35
 
 
The ratione personae of the principle of non-refoulement, as it appears in the Refugee 
Convention, is that it applies to refugees within the meaning of article 1, which is defining 
a refugee. The UNHCR has argued for the importance of the principle not only for refu-
gees, but also for asylum seekers reaffirming; “the fundamental importance of the principle 
of non-refoulement (...) irrespective of whether or not individuals have been formally rec-
ognized as refugees”.36 This was later affirmed by the UN General Assembly which “calls 
on all States to refrain from taking measures that jeopardize the institution of asylum, in 
particular by returning or expelling refugees or asylum-seekers contrary to international 
human rights and to humanitarian and refugee law”.37 There is however one exception to 
this principle. Article 33(2) states that the benefits of non-refoulement may not be claimed 
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of 
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the country. This article is prospective in its application, meaning that it refers to a future 
threat and not a threat in the past.
38
 However article 33(2) does not identify the acts that 
will trigger the application of the national security exception. This is a challenge according 
to UNHCR, since asylum seekers and refugees are often vilified, criminalized and even 
stereotyped as terrorists and can, for these reasons, be denied admission to territories and 
access to protection.
39
 Thus, Lauterpacht and Bethlehem argues that this margin of appreci-
ation, which states enjoy in this matter, is limited in scope by two requirements. Firstly, 
there must be ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that a refugee is a danger to the security of 
the country where he or she is, and the state must provide evidence of a future security risk. 
Secondly, they argue that the threshold for operation of exceptions to the Refugee Conven-
tion must be high, because of the humanitarian character of the convention and the serious 
individual consequences of refoulement.
40
  
2.2.1.2 Torture Convention  
The CAT is based on a general agreement that the prohibition against torture is regarded as 
jus cogens.
41
 Article 3 of the CAT further reaffirms the principle of non-refoulement, 
where it states that “no state party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture.” One thing to notice especially here is that this article only 
prohibits return to torture and does not mention inhuman, degrading treatment. There is in 
general no agreement on the meaning and scope of the term torture, and there is a difficulty 
in identifying the nature of the prohibition involved in treatment or punishment that is cru-
el, inhuman or degrading.
42
 However, article 3 of the ECHR on the other hand, includes 
                                                 
 
38
 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2001:54 
39
 UNHCR, 2007:2 
40
 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2001:55 
41
 Rehman, 2010:810 
42
 Ibid:810-811 
 15 
both torture and inhuman, degrading treatment. Attention will therefore be given to the 
ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR to clarify if there is any distinction. 
2.2.1.3 European Convention on Human Rights 
Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and in Soering 
v. UK, the ECtHR held that this article also extend to cases of extradition in which the asy-
lum seeker would be faced by a real risk of exposure to ill-treatment in the receiving 
state.
43
 The ECtHR has further distinguished between torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment in its case law. The Court held in Ireland v. UK, that acts, which inflicted intense 
physical and mental suffering, would fall within the category of inhuman treatment. Further 
it held that acts were degrading if they: ”arose in their victims, feelings of fear, anguish and 
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly break their physical and 
moral resistance”.44 Lastly, the ECtHR held that an act of torture is distinguished by the 
intensity of the suffering inflicted on the individual. Torture was thereby defined as delib-
erate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering.
45
  
 
However, in the more recent case of Harkins and Edwards v. UK, the ECtHR stated that 
this distinction between torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is more easily drawn 
in domestic cases where the Court is called upon to characterize acts which have already 
taken place. On the other hand, in an extraterritorial context of returnees, there is a need for 
a prospective assessment, and it is not always possible to determine whether the ill-
treatment will be sufficiently severe to qualify as torture.
46
 Further, the Court held that the 
distinction can more easily be drawn in cases where the risk of ill-treatment stems from 
factors which do not engage the responsibility of the public authorities of the receiving 
state, which might be difficult to rely on in certain situations. Because of this, the Court 
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held that whenever a risk of violation of article 3 is found in relation to a proposed return, it 
has refrained from considering whether the ill-treatment in question should be character-
ized as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.
47
 One example of this approach can be 
found in the Chahal case, where the ECtHR held that the Convention prohibits, in absolute 
terms, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and that this prohibition is 
equally absolute in expulsion cases.
48
 The fact that ECtHR now seem to move away from a 
practice of distinguishing between torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, will in the 
end effect the threshold of non-refoulement cases, which will be studied more closely. 
However, first, the common feature of the principle of non-refoulement will be given some 
attention.  
2.2.2 Common features 
As already stated, the principle of non-refoulement consists of two different concepts; one 
concept deriving from refugee law and the other concept deriving from human rights law. 
After studying the treaty basis, it can be stated that non-refoulement proscribes that no per-
son should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution or other 
ill-treatment. This is the core element of the principle, and constitutes a part of the respon-
sibilities to ensure the protection of failed asylum seekers in the post-return phase. Further 
in this thesis, focus will be on the ECHR and the requirements of a non-refoulement case. 
2.3  Three requirements 
UNE and UDI, with the help from Landinfo, provide guidance on which places that can 
and cannot be conceived as safe enough for failed asylum seekers to be returned to. UN-
HCR further publish guidelines on which areas it is not advisable to return failed asylum 
seekers to. Traditionally, Norway has been a country receiving positive feedback from 
UNHCR, however, this changed in 2004 when the Norwegian policy for the first time con-
tradicted the recommendations from UNHCR by returning failed asylum seekers to areas 
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with an armed conflict. When confronted about these contradictions, Erna Solberg, Minis-
ter of Local Government and Regions in 2004, said that: “We will not let us dictate, as we 
make our own assessment on when it is right to forcibly return asylum seekers.”49 The 
rhetoric behind this response seems to be that the Norwegian asylum system is well-
developed, and does not need advice from others. This might be right, but it becomes dan-
gerous when the will to listen to other opinions than our own, goes missing due to our own 
success. 
 
This section will address whether those who risk ill-treatment due to indiscriminate vio-
lence can receive protection under the principle of non-refoulement. Article 3 of the ECHR 
will be in focus because this is the article referred to in the travaux prèparatoires of the 
Immigration Act. Furthermore, there are three main requirements for a case to meet the 
threshold of a non-refoulement case in the ECtHR which will be addressed here; the 
threshold requirement, the proof requirement, and the risk requirement. 
2.3.1 Different threshold for non-refoulement cases 
Practice shows that the threshold of being accepted in the ECtHR as an article 3 case is 
higher for non-refoulement cases, than for domestic cases. According to the case law, ill-
treatment must attain a minimum level of severity for it to fall within the scope of article 
3.
50
 Further, in Aswat v. UK, the Court held that the absolute nature of article 3 do not 
mean that any form of ill-treatment will act as a bar to return a person from a contracting 
state: “treatment which might violate Article 3 because of an act or omission of a Contract-
ing State might not attain the minimum level of severity required for there to be a violation 
of Article 3 in an expulsion or extradition case.”51 The question is why there should be a 
different threshold for cases concerning non-refoulement? It seems that the acceptance of 
ill-treatment may be higher for persons returning to their home countries, a practice that 
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appear to be in contradiction to what was claimed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR); the universal character of human rights.  
 
The doctrine of human rights is based on the idea that each person is a subject of global 
concern. It does not matter what a person’s spatial location might be or which political 
subdivision or social group the person might belong to because everyone has human rights. 
Therefore, responsibilities to respect and protect these rights may, at least in principle, ex-
tend across political and social boundaries.
52
 This was recognized in the UDHR which pro-
claims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and that every-
one enjoys a certain treatment.
53
 Yet, the discourse and practice of human rights can also 
induce a disabling skepticism, even among those who admire its motivating ideas.
54
 
2.3.2 Substantial grounds 
The ECtHR held in Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy that expulsion, extradition or any other 
measure to remove an alien, may give rise to an issue under article 3 of the convention, and 
hence engage the responsibility of the expelling state under the convention, where substan-
tial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would 
face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to article 3 in the receiving coun-
try.
55
 The case concerned Somalian and Eritrean migrants, travelling from Libya, who had 
been intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities and sent back to Libya.
56
 The ECtHR 
found in this case that substantial grounds had been shown for believing that there was a 
real risk that the applicants would be subjected to treatment in Libya contrary to article 3.
57
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For the ECtHR to assess whether there are substantial grounds for the applicant to face 
such risk, the Court is required to assess the conditions in the receiving country against the 
standards of article 3 of the ECHR.
58
  However, the standard used by the ECtHR implies 
that the ill-treatment the applicant alleges that he will face if returned, must reach a mini-
mum level of severity, the threshold requirement, if it is to fall within the scope of article 3 
of the ECHR.
59
 Providing proof that there are substantial grounds for a real risk, may create 
a difficulty of obtaining supporting evidence for victims of ill-treatment, especially consid-
ering the humanitarian situation they are in, and the lack of functioning state apparatus in 
their home countries.
60
 The available information about the home country will be assessed 
in chapter four, looking especially on what information the Norwegian asylum system re-
lies on in their assessment. This is further an important point when it comes to the assess-
ment of the individual and general security situation, which will be studied next. 
2.3.3 Real risk of ill-treatment 
In order to determine whether there is a risk of ill-treatment, the ECtHR examines the fore-
seeable consequences of sending the applicant to the receiving country, bearing in mind the 
general situation there and his personal circumstances.
61
 The individual and general risk 
will be addressed here. 
2.3.3.1 Individual risk 
In order to determine whether there is a risk of ill-treatment upon return, the ECtHR will 
examine the foreseeable consequences of sending the applicant to the receiving country.
62
 
Further, the standard used implies that the ill-treatment the applicant alleges he or she will 
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face if returned, must attain a minimum level of severity. However, the assessment of this 
is relative, and will depend on the circumstances of the case and the person in question.
63
 
Furthermore, denial of protection in the absence of a review of individual circumstances 
would be inconsistent with the prohibition of refoulement built on the essential idea to pro-
tect each individual from refoulement.
64
 
 
As such, the risk threshold in a human rights context can best be described as circumstanc-
es in which substantial grounds can be shown for believing that the individual would face a 
real risk of being subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.
65
 Further, in the case of Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, the ECtHR held that the fact that a large 
number of irregular immigrants in Libya found themselves in the same situation as the ap-
plicants do not make the risk concerned any less individual where the risk is sufficiently 
real and probable.
66
 In other words, the Court held that the protection is needed just as 
much in this case, even though there are many people in need of the same protection, refer-
ring to the general security risk.  
2.3.3.2 General security risk 
The general security risk was defined by the ECtHR in the case of Sufi and Elmi v. UK. 
The case concern the applicants allegations that if returned to Somalia, they would be in 
real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 of the ECHR.
67
 The applicants submitted that the 
indiscriminate violence in Mogadishu was of a sufficient level of intensity to constitute a 
real risk to the life or person of any civilian. Though, previously, the Court has indicated 
that it would only be in the most extreme cases that a situation of general violence would 
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be of sufficient intensity to pose such a risk. The ECtHR has not provided any further guid-
ance on how the intensity of a conflict is to be assessed.
68
  
 
Although, in the case of Sufi and Elmi v. UK, the Court recalls that the Asylum and Immi-
gration Tribunal (AIT) of the United Kingdom had to conduct a similar assessment in AM 
and AM Somalia v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
69
, and by doing so it iden-
tified the following criteria: firstly, whether the parties to the conflict were either employ-
ing methods and tactics of warfare which increased the risk of civilian casualties or directly 
targeting civilians; secondly, whether the use of such methods and/or tactics was wide-
spread among the parties to the conflict; thirdly, whether the fighting was localized or 
widespread; and finally, the number of civilians killed, injured and displaced as a result of 
the fighting. These criteria are similar to the criteria of a non-international armed conflict 
that was provided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in the Tadic case. The ICTY held that for a situation to qualify as being an internal armed 
conflict, there must be protracted armed violence, as was referred to by the AIT, and the 
parties must be organized, not mentioned by the AIT.
70
 These criteria are important be-
cause they function as a threshold for when international humanitarian law applies in a 
non-international armed conflict. In the same way, the criteria the AIT set out are important 
as a benchmark for when indiscriminate violence provide protection under the principle of 
non-refoulement.
71
 Although, the ECtHR held that the criteria provided by the AIT are not 
to be seen as an exhaustive list to be applied in all future cases. Rather, it was held that in 
the context of the present case, the Court considered that they formed an appropriate yard-
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stick by which to assess the level of violence in Mogadishu.
72
 The Court concludes that the 
situation of general violence in Mogadishu is sufficiently intense for it to present a real risk 
of violation of article 3 solely on account of presence there. However, it was further held 
that if the person is well connected to powerful actors in Mogadishu, it could enable him to 
obtain protection and therefore he would not receive protection under article 3.
73
  
 
Furthermore, in the case of A.A. and others, the ECtHR observed that the general situation 
in Yemen remains volatile and extremely tense. However, the Court further stated that the 
general situation of instability and violence in Yemen was not of such intensity that appli-
cants being returned there would be exposed to real risk of treatment contrary to article 3.
74
 
This example refers to the threshold requirement, which is arguably high in cases concern-
ing indiscriminate violence. As was held in the case of Vilvarajah and others, the ECtHR 
explained that the “examination of the existence of a risk of ill-treatment in breach of Arti-
cle 3 at the relevant time must necessarily be a rigorous one in view of the absolute charac-
ter of this provision, and the fact that it enshrines one of the fundamental values of the 
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.”75 Although, this does not mean 
that the Norwegian asylum system cannot set a lower threshold, to ensure the protection of 
failed asylum seekers, also from indiscriminate violence.  
 
Moreover, it can be argued that the threshold is high due to the struggle, or the balancing 
act between the state and the individual.  
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2.4 The balancing act between the state and the individual 
The application of the principle of proportionality in relation to forced return of failed asy-
lum seekers highlights various dilemmas and challenges faced today, and will be given 
some attention here.  
 
The principle of proportionality is regularly used in cases relating to protection of asylum 
seekers. The question is then, whether the danger the refugee may meet if returned out-
weighs the threat to public security that would arise if the person were allowed to stay.
76
  
Though, the person in question will have protection from the human rights regime where 
no exception for the principle of non-refoulement is allowed. Although, even the principle 
of non-refoulement has a threshold, and even here the states have a margin of appreciation 
as to what constitute severe enough ill-treatment for it to make the principle of non-
refoulement applicable, as shown in the previous sections. No state claims that refoulement 
is permissible under international law, but they would go to a great length to characterize 
instances of return as standard immigration control, exclusion or not involving refugees.
77
  
 
Studies show, for instance, that the Norwegian return policy has been tightened by the po-
litical system from 2000 to 2012, meaning that the policy of protecting asylum seekers are 
stricter today than what it was a few years ago. These tightening measures are defended by 
immigration control policies.
78
 In other words, it seems that the threat to the public security 
has been given more weight in Norway the last decade, than the danger the refugee may 
meet if he or she is returned.  
 
A further development that can be seen as a tightening measure is the new law on the op-
tion to set aside a decision for failed asylum seekers. Broadly stated, effective asylum sys-
tems rely upon returning persons who do not need protection in favor of persons who really 
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need protection. In Norway, there are approximately 5700 persons living in asylum centers 
holding a final return decision.
79
 Though, there is a need to strike a balance here. On one 
hand, it is important to make sure that no mistakes are made because the consequences for 
the individual can be devastating. Additionally, a case may develop during the waiting time 
in Norway, as the situation in the home country might change and some may also engage in 
political or religious activities that may affect the outcome of their case. On the other hand, 
only a few of the applications to set aside a decision are upheld. In 2009, only about 6% of 
all the applications resulted in a change in the original decision.
80
 In light of this, one of the 
changes made to the Immigration Act is that if UNE considers it obvious that a request to 
set aside an individual decision cannot succeed, UNE is not obligated to give an individual-
ized ground in its reply. This does not apply if special circumstances suggest the granting 
of an individualized ground.
81
 However, in practice this may make it more difficult for the 
person holding the return decision to set aside the decision if there is a real need for protec-
tion. Although, it will depend on how this new paragraph is implemented in practice.  
 
Nevertheless, the option to set aside a decision is important because it provides a legal 
safeguard. It represents the last alternative for the failed asylum seeker, of which may pre-
vent ill-treatment upon return, and therefore plays an important role in the asylum system. 
The new development to tighten the opportunities for asylum seekers to use this option 
therefore needs to be handled very carefully, without compromising the rights of the appli-
cants.  
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3 After the return: duty to investigate 
Rahim Rostami alleged that he was tortured after he was forcefully returned from Norway 
to Iran.
82
 Due to the existence of stories like this one, the question that will be raised in this 
chapter is whether the Norwegian government has a legal duty to investigate allegations of 
ill-treatment in the post-return phase, or, if the duties of the Norwegian government stop 
when the return has been implemented. 
 
It is worth noting introductory that, for human rights treaties to be applicable to a particular 
individual there is a requirement that a state owes the individual some legal obligations 
under the treaty in question.
83
 This is often what is referred to when the individual is under 
the jurisdiction of the state, and thereby the state’s obligations, under a particular human 
rights treaty. In many of the international human rights treaties, especially those protecting 
civil and political rights, it is the jurisdiction clauses which determine their scope of appli-
cation.
84
 The jurisdiction clause therefore functions as a threshold criterion. This means 
that it needs to be established that the individual is within the jurisdiction of the state in 
order for a treaty obligation to arise in the first place.
85
  A second point is that the returnee 
will be based within another state’s territory in the post-return phase. This does not imply 
that it falls outside the jurisdiction of the sending state since jurisdiction can be seen in oth-
er than territorial terms. Nevertheless, it does complicate the picture and render necessary a 
further discussion. This section will therefore address the duty to investigate, by looking 
both at the territorial and extraterritorial application of the duty. Lastly, this chapter will, in 
brief, view some of the demands from civil society organizations in Norway regarding 
forced return. 
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3.1 Territorial obligations 
Territorial application means, broadly, that the individual concerned is physically located 
within the geographical area over which the state has sovereignty or title at the moment of 
the alleged violation of a human right, and this is usually how jurisdiction is perceived.
86
   
 
Furthermore, the wording of article 12 and 13 in the CAT requires a state party to investi-
gate when there are reasonable grounds to believe that torture occurred ‘in any territory 
under its jurisdiction’, and if a person files a complaint alleging he has been subjected to 
torture ‘in any territory under its jurisdiction’. Additionally, the CAT Committee has stated 
that it: “observes that the right to an effective remedy for a breach of the Convention un-
derpins the entire Convention, for otherwise the protections afforded by the Convention 
would be rendered largely illusory.”87 It is quite clear from this example that there is a du-
ty, on behalf of state parties, to investigate within the geographical area over which the 
state has sovereignty or title. In the case where Norway returns asylum seekers, this duty 
will only be applicable if the act of ill-treatment occurs within the territory of the Norwe-
gian state.  
 
Similarly, the ECtHR held in Assenov v. Bulgaria, that without a duty to investigate: “the 
general legal prohibition (…) would be ineffective in practice.”88 That is, within the geo-
graphical area as this is a domestic case. However, it is noteworthy that in this case, the 
Court did not find a violation of article 3 based on the allegations of ill-treatment by the 
police; but because of the state’s failure to carry out an effective investigation into the ap-
plicant’s allegation of ill-treatment.89 The ECtHR has implied that there is a duty to inves-
tigate under article 2 and article 3 of the ECHR, the right to life and prohibition of torture 
respectively. This duty has been derived from article 1 of the Convention, which is the 
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state’s general duty to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in the Convention. Further, the jurisdiction of a state, within the meaning of article 
1, is essentially seen in territorial terms.
90
 However, the question of whether the duty to 
investigate can arise extraterritorially still remains. 
3.2 Is there a duty to investigate extraterritorially?   
Extraterritorial application means that at the moment of the alleged violation of a human 
right, the individual concerned is not physically located in the geographical area over 
which the state has sovereignty or title.
91
 For a returnee, this means that the violation takes 
place when he or she is not within the Norwegian territory. Looking at the human rights 
treaties, extraterritorial application is usually an issue that will arise from an extraterritorial 
state act. This can be either commission or omission, which is performed outside the state 
borders. However, extraterritorial application in general does not require an extraterritorial 
state act, but solely that the individual concerned is located outside the territory of the state, 
while the violation of his rights may take place inside the state.
92
  
 
Furthermore, a non-refoulement case will be looked at to study the relation between territo-
rial and extraterritorial obligations in more detail. The complainant Ahmed Hussein Musta-
fa Kamil Agiza, an Egyptian national, came to Sweden to search for asylum. His applica-
tion was rejected by the Swedish authorities and he was returned to Egypt in 2001. Follow-
ing the forced return to Egypt, the complainant alleged that he was tortured while in custo-
dy. He therefore claimed that his removal by Sweden to Egypt violated article 3 of the 
CAT.
93
 The CAT Committee came to the conclusion that Sweden failed to provide for a 
review by an effective, independent and partial judicial body of the Migration Board's deci-
sion to expel the complainant. Due to national security concerns in the case, the tribunals 
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(equivalent to UDI and UNE) relinquished the complainant’s case to the government, 
which took the first and final decision to return Agiza. The Committee emphasized that 
there was no possibility for review of any kind of this decision. Further the Committee re-
called that the Convention’s protections is absolute, even in the context of national security 
concerns, and that such considerations emphasize the importance of appropriate review 
mechanisms.
94
  
 
It is important to look at the reasoning made in the communication by the CAT Committee 
for two different reasons. Firstly, the CAT Committee observes that in the case of an alle-
gation of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment having occurred, the right to 
remedy requires, after the event, an effective, independent and impartial investigation of 
such allegations.
95
 However, the nature of refoulement is such that an allegation of a breach 
under article 3 concerns an asylum seeker's potential removal. In practice, this means that 
the right to an effective remedy contained in article 3 of the CAT requires an opportunity 
for effective, independent and impartial review of the decision to expel or remove the indi-
vidual.
96
 This is important because the focus is on the return decision and the reasoning 
behind this decision, rather than on the effects of the decision. In other words, these provi-
sions focus on the act conducted by the state within its territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
representatives in the Norwegian asylum system argues that there is no obligation to follow 
up on the returnee post-return, since the decision made in Norway has taken all the precau-
tions necessary, within the legal obligations of the state.
97
 Nevertheless, since any system 
may make a mistake, the question still remains whether it can be argued that there is a legal 
duty to investigate allegations of torture in the post-return phase.  
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To justify extraterritorial jurisdiction the ECtHR has held, for instance in Issa and others v. 
Turkey that: “Accountability in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the 
Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own terri-
tory”.98 This implies that the ECHR can apply extraterritorially, and the argumentation for 
such an application is in line with article 31(1) of the VCLT, which states that a treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
 
Additionally, looking at the nature of extraterritorial obligations, the question of whether 
there is any difference between a negative and a positive duty’s jurisdictional reach, will be 
studied. In brief, there is a common assumption that obligations of contracting states cannot 
be ‘divided and tailored’, which was held by the ECtHR in the Bankovic case.99 Based on 
this line of thought it is reasonable to believe that positive obligations apply in full where 
human rights law is considered applicable.
100
 Looking at the right to life, enshrined in arti-
cle 2 of the ECHR, the ECtHR has held that this right also obliges the state to take appro-
priate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.
101
 This means that the 
right demands both negative and positive actions by the state. However, the ECtHR has 
also held that the positive obligation is not unlimited as: “the scope of the positive obliga-
tion must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate 
burden on the authorities. Not every claimed risk to life, therefore, can entail for the author-
ities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from mate-
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rializing”.102 Although in the case of Al-Skeini the ECtHR held that: “It is clear that, when-
ever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus 
jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the 
rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of 
that individual.”103 By stating this, the Court once again held that the rights of the ECHR 
cannot be ‘divided and tailored’, as was argued for in the Bankovic case.104 Thereby, stat-
ing once again, that the right demands the state to take both negative and positive actions. 
The distinction between positive and negative duties will be addressed in more detail in the 
third model of extraterritorial application presented in this thesis.  
 
Moreover, the question that will be raised in this part of the thesis is whether the Norwe-
gian state has a duty to investigate allegations of torture committed by another state or third 
party inside the territory of another state. Different analyzes have been conducted on the 
existing jurisprudence suggesting that the exercise of jurisdiction can relate to different 
targets which allows the development of certain categories of extraterritorial conduct. In 
this thesis three models of extraterritorial application will be addressed for the purpose of 
studying the reach of state obligations. However, it is not always clear how a particular set 
of facts should be categorized, making the foundation of this discussion complicated. It is 
therefore beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a clear analysis of the concept of extra-
territorial jurisdiction. An effort will however be made within the limitations of this thesis, 
as extraterritorial jurisdiction is a crucial concept in the assessment of the legal duties of the 
state in the post-return phase. 
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3.3 Three models of extraterritorial obligations     
The first model looks at jurisdiction as control over territory and is called the spatial model. 
This model was articulated by the ECtHR in the Loizidou case,
105
 and has also been ap-
plied by the International Court of Justice, which found the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights to apply during occupation of the Palestinian territory and in the case 
of Congo v. Uganda.
106
 According to this approach, a state has human rights obligations 
towards a territory’s inhabitants, if the state exercises control over the territory of another 
state that in many ways replicates the extent of control it has over its own territory. Argua-
bly, for the present matter under discussion, this approach may be too limiting. If this juris-
diction is applied too strictly, it may allow many human rights abuses to slip through the 
cracks.
107
 A returnee in the post-return phase would not be protected by the sending state in 
this approach, since he or she is located outside the territory of the sending state. 
  
The second model looks at jurisdiction as control over individuals and is called the person-
al model. This model was first set out by the European Commission, and has later been 
used by the Human Rights Committee, which essentially makes an appeal to the universali-
ty of human rights in order to justify the personal model.
108
 In its General Comment No. 
31, it states that a “State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant 
to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated 
within the territory of the State Party.”109 However, the reference to jurisdiction over indi-
viduals runs against the language of some treaties, which explicitly mentions state jurisdic-
tion in territorial terms. Opponents of this model argue that this type of jurisdiction cannot 
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be limited on any principled basis, and therefore loses any meaning as a threshold.
110
 Un-
like the spatial model, the personal model can be said to be too broad in its scope. This ap-
proach simply falls into the position that a state has human rights obligations whenever it 
can actually violate the rights of the individuals concerned.
111
 Returnees in the post-return 
phase will not be covered by this category however, because it is not the Norwegian state 
that will commit the human rights violation of torture or ill-treatment in the post-return 
phase. The two models already addressed, both concern the extraterritorial conduct of the 
state, meaning the acts of the Norwegian state in another territory.
112
 However, the individ-
ual will fall within the jurisdiction of the sending state, even though the direct human rights 
violation does not. This is because the return is the relevant human right violation and not 
the acts in the post-return phase according to these models, which was also held by the 
CAT Committee in the case of Agzia v. Sweden.
113
    
 
Marko Milanovic argues for a third model. This model is based on the distinction between 
the positive obligation of states to secure or ensure human rights, requiring states to under-
take various steps to fulfil and protect the rights of individuals, and the negative obligation 
of states to respect human rights, which requires a state to refrain from interfering with the 
rights of individuals without sufficient justice. The provisions defining the scope of appli-
cation in the human rights treaties often distinguish between these two types of state obli-
gations.
114
 The jurisdiction of the state is conceived of only territorially, but the threshold 
criterion applies only to positive obligations of states to secure or ensure human rights. It is 
argued by Milanovic, that only through a sufficient degree of control over a territory can 
the positive obligations be realistically kept. When it comes to negative obligations to re-
spect human rights, no threshold criterion should apply because states can control the ac-
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tions of their organs or agents.
115
 Milanovic argues that the positive obligation of a state to 
ensure the human rights of persons within its jurisdiction from violations by private parties 
is not absolute, but the state must exercise due diligence. As such, the state has to take all 
measures reasonably within their power to prevent violations of human rights.
116
  
 
Milanovic further gives an example which is relevant to the focus of this thesis; he argues 
that extraterritorial killing by third parties can engage the state’s positive obligations to do 
all it reasonably can to prevent such killings, and the obligation to investigate them.
117
 He 
supports his argument by referring to the judgment from the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights where it held that: “An illegal act which violates human rights and which is 
initially not directly imputable to a State (…) can lead to international responsibility of the 
State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the 
violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.” As such, Milanovic argues that 
there exist different categories of positive obligations, where the first category exists only 
to make the state’s negative obligations truly effective. This category of positive obliga-
tions should apply coextensively with the negative obligations themselves, in other words 
extraterritorially. On the other hand, those positive obligations which flow from the state’s 
duty to secure or ensure human rights or prevent violations hence require a threshold that 
sets out the limits of realistic compliance, which is the threshold of state jurisdiction.
118
 It 
can therefore be argued that the Norwegian government has a duty to investigate allega-
tions of torture after the return has been implemented. The investigation is part of what 
Milanovic calls the first category of positive duties, necessary to make the negative duties 
of the state effective, such as the obligation not to torture. By returning a person to a coun-
try where he or she is tortured, there is a violation of the prohibition of torture, as was de-
scribed in the previous chapter. Therefore, a duty to investigate allegations of torture may 
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be seen as necessary to make the state’s duty not to torture truly effective, and should there-
fore also apply extraterritorially.  
 
Further, the third model is however neither free of weaknesses. Adopting this model would 
require a radical rethinking of the approach of the ECtHR, and also that of other human 
rights bodies.
119
 Nevertheless it is not impossible for the ECtHR to rethink its approach 
since it sees the convention as a living instrument, as was held in Soering: “the Convention 
is a living instrument which (...) must be interpreted in the light of present-day condi-
tions”.120 Additionally, the ECtHR held in the Al-Skeini case that the rights of the ECHR 
cannot be ‘divided and tailored,’ and that states have to secure the rights of the ECHR 
which are relevant to the situation of the individual.
121
 It can therefore be argued that it is 
within reason to state that the ECtHR could in principle argue for an obligation to investi-
gate, if not full investigation, than at least to demand that the sending state provide some 
mechanisms to ensure its obligations under article 3.  
 
However, Milanovic further brings to light that the positive duty need to be judged reason-
ably and within the scope of what can realistically be expected from the state.
122
 It there-
fore seems crucial to take into the assessment what the Norwegian asylum system ought to 
have known at the time when the return was implemented. This will be addressed in the 
next chapter.  
 
The third model presented here provides a foundation that allows the discourse to move 
from the question of when human rights treaties apply extraterritorially to the question of 
how they do so;
123
 a discussion that should be given more attention. Though, various civil 
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society organizations have already addressed the issue of investigation in the post-return 
phase.    
3.4 Demands from civil society organizations  
It is important to remember that any system will make mistakes, and it should therefore not 
be assumed that the asylum system will be any exception; a mechanism that can handle 
mistakes when they occur is arguably needed.  
 
The Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons recommended to European 
states in 2013, that there should be drawn common rules on the procedures to be followed 
after unsuccessful return, including compulsory reporting.
124
 The procedures to handle an 
unsuccessful return are usually not systematic, but rather based on ad hoc arrangements. 
Christine Dahl, senior advisor at UNE, said that in some cases UNE has received infor-
mation about reactions upon return in the post-return phase. She further argued that UNE 
always takes such statements seriously and investigates allegations closer if they see the 
basis for it. In some cases it has been shown that the returnee has been temporarily detained 
by the authorities in connection with entry control and identity determination. In other cas-
es, it has not been possible for UNE to investigate the allegations further.
125
 UNE does not 
function as a fact-finding body but it can cooperate with embassies and UNHCR to follow 
up on the returnees in special circumstances. As such, it is argued that the Norwegian asy-
lum system is rather focusing on the pre-assessment, to the extent that there is no doubt that 
it is safe to return the asylum seeker. 
 
In light of this, civil society organizations in Norway have formulated eight demands on 
how to improve the legal safeguards in the Norwegian asylum system. They argue, 
amongst others, that there have been several cases where there are reasons to fear that asy-
lum seekers have been subjected to persecution after returning to their home country. 
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Therefore they argue that there should be established an obligation to follow up on allega-
tions of torture and ill-treatment in the post-return phase. It is further stated that this must 
include an obligation to assist returnees if there was an unsuccessful return.
126
  During con-
versations with civil society organizations, it has become quite clear that there is a need for 
better mechanisms to follow up on the decisions made to return a person. Additionally 
there is a need to address the duties of the Norwegian government, also after the return has 
been implemented. 
 
In the next chapter, general trends regarding the post-return phase will be looked at more 
closely to see whether they can provide more information on the life of returnees after the 
return, and on the struggle between the government and the asylum seeker which can take 
place when a person is asked to return voluntarily.    
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4 After the return: lack of information? 
In the previous chapter the duty to investigate was addressed, concerning situations where 
the Norwegian state receives complaints about alleged torture or ill-treatment. In this chap-
ter the analysis will be more general, looking at what research and Landinfo can tell about 
life after return. This knowledge is believed to be important to ensure the protection of 
failed asylum seekers, especially because it might not be that those who manage to contact 
the Norwegian government with a complaint that they have been tortured or ill-treated, are 
the ones in greatest need of protection.  
 
This chapter will start by addressing suggestions from previous research, to see what can be 
told about life after return. This analysis will not give the complete picture of what is 
known about the post-return phase since very few research projects have been chosen for 
the analysis, but it will provide an insight into a few important aspects about the life of a 
failed asylum seeker. Additionally this chapter will highlight a public debate concerning 
lack of knowledge about the persons who are forcefully returned from Norway. Thereafter 
the question of how, and what kind of information, Landinfo collects by looking at infor-
mation concerning Eritrea, will be addressed. Lastly this chapter will, in brief, argue for a 
need for further attention by the government to the issue at hand.  
4.1 Suggestions from research 
A few research projects will be presented here to see whether there are any general trends 
that can be presented about the post-return phase.  
4.1.1 Durable solutions 
Dr. Chase and Allsopp have produced a working paper about the contested futures of inde-
pendent young migrants in Europe which is providing useful insight into life after return.
127
 
Their research is focusing on young independent migrants above the age of 18, but they 
highlight several general trends which are applicable to other age groups as well. They 
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identify and critically examine assumptions upon which the European policy response to 
independent youth migration is based. One of the assumptions is that returning young peo-
ple to countries of origin, or previous residence, is a durable solution. Two main points will 
be highlighted here, looking at what a durable solution is, and who defines what a durable 
solution is for whom.  
 
The first point relates to the lack of knowledge about long-term outcomes for those who are 
in fact returned. It is argued that there is practically no empirical evidence concerning the 
extent to which outcomes could be defined as a durable solution.
128
 A durable solution 
means, in broad terms, the integration of refugees into a society. This can be reintegration 
into their home country after voluntary return, integration into the country of asylum if set-
tlement is permitted, or integration in a third country through resettlement.
129
 A small, but 
growing body of evidence, points to patterns where re-migration are becoming part of the 
durable solution constructed by the migrant;
130
 a solution which is the opposite of integra-
tion into the society. This suggests that there is a lack of knowledge about the whole reinte-
gration process.   
 
Hence, there is a bias of return as a future option for independent migrants, and lack of fol-
low-up or accountability following their return. This suggests that durable solutions are 
primarily contrived to serve the state rather than the individual, which relate to the discus-
sion on proportionality in chapter 2 of this thesis. It is for example reported that European 
countries continues to return individuals to Kabul, in spite of clear warnings from Afghan 
officials that they are not in a position to uphold the rights of returnees.
131
 This is also the 
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case in Norway, where the government has been criticized for returning migrants to an in-
ternal flight option in Kabul since the home area is not safe enough.
132
  
 
The second point relates to the term deportation gap; emphasizing the gap between the 
number of people eligible for return at any time, and the number of people a state actually 
returns.
133
 One case that shows the applicability of these trends in the Norwegian context is 
the story of Yemane Teferi. He has lived in thirteen different reception centers for more 
than 22 years. Yemane is from Eritrea and applied for asylum in Norway, but was rejected. 
He has later tried to set aside the decision, but his effort has been unsuccessful. Though, PU 
is not able to return him to Eritrea either, because that would be against the regulations re-
garding return to Eritrea set out by UDI.
134
 Yemane is therefore staying in Norway illegally 
due to the return decision he holds.  
 
There are 5700 persons like Yeamane, they have a return decision but are not returning 
voluntarily and are therefore waiting for PU to return them by force.
135
 In addition, there 
are people who live outside the reception centers who hold a return decision. Statistics 
Norway (SSB) calculated that the number of irregular migrants in 2008 was 18 000. The 
director of UDI expects that this number has grown since 2008, and is addressing this issue 
under the heading: “How to make failed asylum seekers return?”136 In this article the Direc-
tor of UDI refers to the number of returns in 2013, where PU has reported that they re-
turned 5934 persons in total. Of these, only 1 270 were failed asylum seekers who were 
sent back to their home country, 1 400 were sent to another Dublin country and the rest 
were expelled because of crimes they had committed. The Director admits that these num-
bers show that the Norwegian asylum system is very far away from a situation where all 
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failed asylum seekers, who refuse to return voluntarily, are returned with force. He is there-
fore, in his article, encouraging any person who is in contact with asylum seekers, to help 
them understand that they need to return on their own. If they do not return voluntarily, 
there is a great chance that they will end up in what is here called the deportation gap.
137
 
4.1.2 The struggle 
The deportation gap also refers to a struggle between the rejected asylum seeker and the 
government. Marko Valenta classifies this struggle as a real conflict. On the one hand, 
there are a large number of rejected asylum seekers who for various reasons oppose the 
final rejection and the return. On the other hand, the Norwegian authorities are trying to 
return these asylum seekers using motivation through reintegration programs or force.
138
 
Valenta conducted interviews with rejected asylum seekers opposing the return decision, 
and one man from Somalia said: 
 
The Norwegian government has decided that I can return, but everything I 
read about Somalia indicate that the situation is worse now than before (….) 
I have been outside Somalia since I was seven years old. I don’t know what 
the Norwegian government thinks. Perhaps they think that if I wait long 
enough at the reception center, I will volunteer to go back, but I will not.
139
 
  
This quote demonstrates clearly the struggle between the state and the asylum seeker. The 
European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) notes in a report from 2011, that in 
cases where a person has been ordered to return but the removal cannot be enforced, the 
Return Directive and other policy papers from EU do not provide for a mechanism to put 
an end to the situations of protracted non-removability.
140
 This suggests that the Norwegian 
government should look elsewhere for inspiration to ensure a better life for failed asylum 
seekers.  
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4.1.3 A voiceless group 
Another research project should be mentioned here, where two Norwegian researchers have 
done a comparative analysis of two land-based return and reintegration programs under 
IOM, focusing on Iraq and Afghanistan.
141
 In this research, Strand and Paasche argue that 
irregular migrants are overwhelmingly voiceless. When they have left the country by a vol-
untary return, they become totally silenced, while their voluntary return is used by the host 
state to legitimize forced return of others. After 30 asylum seekers from Iraq were returned 
by force 6 December 2009 to areas the UNHCR described as very uncertain, the Minister 
of Justice, Knut Storberget, defended the return operation, by amongst others, showing to 
the fact that voluntary return took place in the same areas. If that was the case, it should be 
safe enough for those who are returned by force, it was argued.
142
 It is not stated here that 
these arguments are used by UDI or UNE in their proceedings; it is rather to show how 
arguments are built without empirical evidence that the persons returned voluntary are do-
ing fine. UDI and UNE will, however, in most cases rely on Landinfo, the primary mecha-
nisms for collecting information within the asylum system. 
4.2 Public debate 
Doing research on the post-return phase has been debated in the public sphere in Norway, 
and a research project on life after return was rejected by the former political government. 
14 March 2011 Atle Dyregrov, a Norwegian psychologist, raised his concerns for the lack 
of knowledge about life after return. He believes that Norway has both a moral and politi-
cal obligation, to find out what happens to returned asylum seekers. On 17 March 2011, 
this was also addressed in the Norwegian Parliament by one of the political parties in oppo-
sition during the question time. It was argued by the Christian Democrats (KrF) that Nor-
way has a moral obligation to find out what happens to returned asylum seekers, especially 
those who are forcibly returned to countries like Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. The question 
was raised whether the Minister of Justice would initiate, or encourage, research on this 
                                                 
 
141
 Paasche and Strand, 2012 
142
 Paasche and Strand, 2012:219 
 42 
topic. The Minister of Justice at that time, Grete Faremo, replied in essence that such a re-
search project would not give the answers needed because of a number of practical chal-
lenges with such a project, such as difficulties in locating the returnees, the risk of giving 
the returnee a false hope of receiving protection in Norway, and the risk of receiving biased 
and false information.
143
 It is therefore pertinent to study how the asylum system collects 
information and whether this also consists of information about life after return.  
4.3 The case of Eritrea 
Dahl argues that UNE has so far not documented that returnees have suffered persecution 
as a result of circumstances that were indicated in the application for protection in Nor-
way.
144
 This statement is particularly interesting because it gives a somewhat halted pic-
ture. What is referred to here is that UNE has not documented the particular case. The next 
question will therefore be how, and what type of information is documented by the Norwe-
gian asylum system? 
 
Landinfo, the primary source of objective information in asylum cases, is highly perceived 
as a fact-finding body, and are used as a source by the ECtHR in its assessment of cases. 
Jorg Lange, the director of Landinfo, said that if there is a discrepancy with other sources 
of information, they will hold on to their interpretation of the situation until they can access 
the sources behind the other position. Thereafter they will make an assessment of which 
sources are reliable and which ones are not. He further argued that in their experience, oth-
er fact-finding actors have not always been willing to relieve their sources, and they have 
therefore not been able to assess whether their information is correct or not.
145
 There have 
been discrepancies in the past, and this was argued to be the reason behind some of them.  
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Furthermore, to study how Landinfo work, information about the reactions a forced asylum 
seeker may meet in Eritrea will be studied here. Landinfo was asked to come with a re-
sponse on returned asylum seekers and how they are treated. Two questions were raised; 
how the government of Eritrea perceives an application for asylum in another country, and 
if a person hands in an application for asylum in another country, whether the application 
itself has led to reactions by the Eritrean government or not.   
 
 According to the mandate of Landinfo, it does not prepare risk assessments in relation to 
what might happen to a single applicant or group of asylum seekers after return.
146
 Landin-
fo will provide information about statements made by other experts and institutions, which 
may disclose assessments of what the outcome of the return of asylum seekers to a specific 
country may be. This is the case in the response assessed here.
147
 Landinfo concludes in its 
answer that, according to their experience, it is very difficult to get secure and verifiable 
information about what will happen to returned asylum seekers and how Eritrea has reacted 
to those asylum seekers who have returned.
148
 
 
Looking at the facts it appears in several reports that Eritreans, who have been forcibly 
returned, risk extrajudicial arrests and internments, abuse and torture. Eritreans who re-
turned from Malta in 2002, and Libya in 2004, were arrested on arrival in Eritrea and sub-
jected to torture. It is also reported that most of the 1,200 Eritrean asylum seekers that were 
forcibly returned from Egypt in June 2008, were detained in military camps on return. 
Thereafter, in December 2008, at least 740 of these were still in a military camp.
149
 Thus, 
experts on Eritrea and organizations like Amnesty International argue that returning an 
asylum seeker to Eritrea will with a very high probability lead to ill-treatment.
150
 However, 
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Landinfo questions the empirical basis for their statements and has therefore presented a 
letter to the Norwegian asylum system stating that practice has shown that ill-treatment has 
happened upon return in the past. Landinfo thereby refrains from making any assumptions 
of what may happen in the future, other than making a statement that there have been a few 
years since there has been a return of asylum seekers to Eritrea. Therefore the current prac-
tice of the state response is unknown.  
 
Further UNE has made guidelines on how to deal with citizens of Eritrea that do not meet 
the requirements under the Refugee Convention, and are therefore not recognized as refu-
gees. The asylum seeker is obliged to leave Norway voluntarily within the return deadline. 
This is because UNE see the general security situation in Eritrea as safe enough to return 
voluntarily without police escort. According to UNE, voluntary return has occurred to Eri-
trea from Sudan and Ethiopia without reactions by the government. If the asylum seekers 
do not leave voluntarily before the deadline, PU will organize a forced return. However, 
PU cannot follow the returnee the whole way to Eritrea because there are great uncertain-
ties on what reactions the government of Eritrea may give to persons that are forcibly re-
turned. These reactions may constitute persecution under international law, and it is there-
fore important that the Eritrean government do not find out that the person is forcibly re-
turned. In such a return policy, questions should be raised on whether this practice is pro-
portional according to the risks the returnee may phase.  
 
It may be argued that through Landinfo the Norwegian asylum system access information 
about the situation returnees may face. However, Eritrea has a special history of portraying 
asylum seekers as enemies of the country, as was the reason for why Landinfo was asked to 
make a note on this issue, and therefore the Norwegian government rarely returns persons 
to Eritrea by force.
151
 Lange said that they experience challenges in finding information on 
how specific groups are treated post-return because of difficulty in finding empirical and 
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updated data.
152
 Afghanistan is, in contrast to Eritrea, one of the countries where most per-
sons are returned to by force from Norway. Knowledge about the reaction to return in this 
country is however not as clear as in the case of Eritrea. Furthermore, the person responsi-
ble for collecting information about Afghanistan at Landinfo explains that he is often invit-
ed to UNE or other events, to provide a statement about the situation in Afghanistan. Along 
with him, there is usually a professor or a representative from an organization who holds a 
different opinion than what he does.
153
 It is one opinion against the other, and what the re-
turnee may meet may therefore not be certain by the decision makers in all cases.  
4.4 Need for further attention 
The principle of non-refoulement is based on the idea of having a legal safeguard made to 
ensure that no person is sent to ill-treatment. It has been argued that because the sending 
state has obligations to make sure that the return decision is correct, this will in itself pro-
tect the returnee in the post-return phase.
154
 However, something is missing in this line of 
reasoning. To be able to ensure that the return decision was made correctly, there needs to 
be some kind of legal provision that obliges the state, if not to monitor, than at least to take 
allegations of ill-treatment seriously. Additionally the government should encourage re-
search on life after return, which in the end, will help them to make better assessments of 
the needs of asylum seekers coming to Norway in search of protection. As has been shown 
by the practice of the Norwegian asylum system in this chapter, Landinfo experience chal-
lenges in gathering enough reliable information about risks in the post-return phase, and 
little has been done to compensate this deficiency. It is argued here that this deserves atten-
tion by the government, in order to be able to provide a better protection for failed asylum 
seekers.  
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In the next chapter attention will be given to different types of assurances the Norwegian 
government has put in place to make sure that the returnee is not deprived of his right not 
to be tortured.  
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5 After the return: different forms of assurances 
The Norwegian asylum system has taken some measures to make sure that no person is 
returned to ill-treatment. This chapter will analyze four such mechanisms; special repre-
sentatives working with immigration cases, a closer control by UNE before persons are 
returned to a special area, programs for monitoring the post-return phase and diplomatic 
assurances made between two countries.  Lastly this chapter analyzes an example regarding 
the transfer of prisoners between two states, to see what the asylum system may learn from 
the Norwegian Armed Forces, here represented by the Norwegian contribution to the ISAF 
forces.  
5.1 Four mechanisms for better protection 
5.1.1 Special representatives 
UDI have people working as special representatives, called attaché, at different embassies 
and consulates with responsibility to work to clarify the identity of persons, and to facilitate 
return. In the job description it is clarified that the person shall manage and respond to re-
quests for verification of the identity of individuals applying for asylum in Norway. Addi-
tionally, the special representative will cooperate with UDI on return of asylum seekers by 
force, and those that return through IOM’s voluntary return programs. Embedded in the 
work is also a responsibility to follow the general human rights situation closely and report 
on its own initiative and on instruction by the Norwegian asylum system. Making reports 
on the circumstances in the host country and areas of importance to the immigration au-
thorities may also be conducted.  The special representative belongs to the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs administratively, but will relate to UDI as the overriding authority on the topic 
of immigration and have close contact with PU’s special representative’s working in the 
same geographical area.
155
 This is a potential resource, not only to supplement the infor-
mation work done by Landinfo, but also to be present on the ground and assist if requested 
to check up on a returnee post-return. 
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5.1.2 Closer control before return  
The second mechanism used by the Norwegian asylum system is not as comprehensive, but 
may still help to improve the protection of the returnee. On the 8 February 2013, UNE re-
pealed the suspension of the duty to return to Mogadishu and to South Somalia and there-
fore sent a letter to PU, addressed here.  
 
In 2010, the grand board of UNE made a decision involving the return to Mogadishu, 
which resulted in a ban on returns to Mogadishu. The grand board concluded that the gen-
eral security situation in Mogadishu is so severe that citizens in general risk ill-treatment. A 
return was therefore not possible. After this decision, the grand board came with two new 
decisions in 2012, where the grand board saw the security situation as less severe with the 
implication that not all asylum seekers should be protected against return to Mogadishu. In 
other words it argued that cases regarding return to Mogadishu could be assessed on indi-
vidual bases. As a consequence of these decisions, UNE revoked the suspension of the duty 
to return to Mogadishu in 2013.
156
 In a letter, PU is therefore requested to contact UNE 
before every forced return is conducted to these areas. This does not depend on whether 
there exists an application to set aside a decision or not; this has to be done in all the cases 
for the first six months. Additionally, PU is requested to start returning those who got their 
final decision from the grand board.
157
 Administratively PU takes its orders from the Na-
tional Police Directorate, which again reports to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. 
However, UDI and UNE make decisions in individual cases and will therefore provide 
guidance for how PU works.
158
 
 
Norway has received criticism, from amongst others, Amnesty International and NOAS for 
returning persons to South and Central Somalia, since the situation is not perceived as safe 
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enough by other actors.
159
 It might be asked whether this will improve the legal safeguards 
for the returnee. In practice this may well be more of a ‘warning’ sign than anything else. 
This is argued because the person will still be returned, and there is no monitoring of what 
will meet the person in the post-return phase, especially because it is not perceived as safe 
for the Norwegian PU officers to follow the returnee all the way to Somalia.
160
 Further, by 
asking PU to start with those who had their decision heard by the grand board, consisting of 
three board chairs and four board members, there is also a recognition that this is a more 
legally secure decision than the other decisions taken by one board chair and two board 
members, which is the minimum requirement in § 78 of the Immigration Act. This is im-
portant because it has to do with the legal safeguards embedded in the decisions made to 
return a person and thereby the protection of failed asylum seekers. 
5.1.3 Monitoring program in Sri Lanka 
In the 1990s the UNHCR came with recommendations on whether countries should or 
should not return persons to Sri Lanka. It was a turbulent time in Sri Lanka and asylum 
seekers where approaching the Nordic countries.
161
 The Norwegian approach was quite 
clear at this time, as it was believed that some Tamils could be returned, and from 1996 
most of the Tamil asylum seekers were returned.
162
 At the same time certain groups in the 
civil society in Norway put a lot of pressure on the government not to return Tamils to Sri 
Lanka. Their claim was that the Norwegian government returned Tamils to torture and 
death, however, no evidence was presented in this debate. A modest monitoring program 
was therefore established by the Norwegian government, to provide evidence that no one 
was returned to ill-treatment in Sri Lanka.
163
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The Nordic countries
164
 had an attaché at the Norwegian embassy in Colombo, Sri Lanka 
from 1998 until about 2001, to run the program. The Norwegian embassy in Colombo was 
notified whenever there was a return. The embassy would then contact the Ministry of For-
eign affairs in Sri Lanka which notified the immigration authorities. Of course, there was 
no mention of the fact that the person had applied for asylum in Norway and was rejected, 
but as was stated by the Nordic attaché, they understood the circumstances of these cases. 
When the flight arrived, a person from the embassy would meet the returnee at the airport 
to observe how the immigration authorities would treat the returnee. Most often, the return-
ees would go straight through the immigration control, but in a few cases the police were 
notified and the person was detained at the airport. They were held there between a few 
hours, and a few days, for security reasons, usually to make sure that they were not affiliat-
ed with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Thereafter, the agreement was that everyone 
had to come to the embassy for an interview, and a financial incentive was provided to en-
sure that everyone came. The Nordic attaché explained that everyone came to the embassy, 
between one day and a few weeks after arrival. He would then ask questions like how PU 
had behaved on the flight; what had happened at the airport if detained; and what had hap-
pened during the time after the arrival.  
 
From 1998 until 2001, about 200 persons were followed up, and no one reported that they 
had experienced ill-treatment.
165
 According to the Nordic attaché, there were a few local 
NGOs which protested and alleged that two returnees had been subjected to ill-treatment; 
however, they could not confirm this story with physical marks on their bodies or other 
evidence. Additionally, two Norwegian lawyers travelled to Sri Lanka to make their own 
fact-finding mission. This mission resulted in a note concluding quite different from the 
experience of the Nordic attaché; that it was not safe to return Tamils to Colombo.
166
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The program described here is exceptional in the Norwegian context. Little information 
exists about similar programs suggesting that there are none, or at least very few. The ques-
tion is therefore what the rationale behind the program was, and why the state suddenly 
started to monitor the post-return phase. According to the Nordic attaché, the whole idea 
behind the program was to refute accusations of return to ill-treatment. The Norwegian 
position that it was safe to return Tamils to Colombo was not affected. However, it seems 
that the pressure from civil society actors was too much to handle without hard facts to 
support their arguments. It is worth noting that at that time, the asylum system was under 
direct political control, which may also have had an effect on the origin of the program.
167
  
 
Further, the interviews conducted in the embassy revolved around social, humanitarian and 
psychological difficulties the returnees were facing. There was hardly any talk about secu-
rity issues or risk of ill-treatment according to the Nordic attaché. He further argued that 
the whole program presented a paradox because the asylum system is based on making the 
right decision, rather than creating legal safeguards post-return to make sure that the deci-
sion is correct. The program itself was therefore more of a showcase, because the return 
decision was correct in all the cases followed up on by the embassy, meaning that no one 
had been subjected to torture or ill-treatment post-return.
168
 This is also important to know 
because it can prove that the Norwegian state do not return persons to torture. The fact that 
a lawyer was of a different opinion is not the crucial point here, rather it is important to see 
that monitoring the post-return phase in this case could provide some facts which the asy-
lum system could learn from. Whether a monitoring system is an effective way to ensure 
protection post-return is debated, and will briefly be touched upon in the next section, deal-
ing with diplomatic assurances. 
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5.1.4 Diplomatic assurances 
A fourth measure used to ensure that the return will be in line with the legal and moral ob-
ligations a state have, is diplomatic assurances. For the return to take place, there need to be 
a close cooperation between the sending and the receiving country. Diplomatic assurances 
are made through bilateral agreements, called readmission agreements, and are most com-
monly used for regulating migration.
169
 Readmission agreements are not a prerequisite for 
returning a person, but it can be necessary to facilitate the return to some countries. The 
agreement committed the parties to mutually accept their own citizens, and the framework 
for the practical circumstances surrounding the return, for example, work to identify the 
returnee and provide travel documents.
170
 Forced Return can be problematic in cases where 
the country of origin refuses to accept the returnee. When this happens, the host country is 
obliged to take the returnee back. This is usually the case when the identity and nationality 
of the returnee have not been properly established. The EU has signed readmission agree-
ments to be able to avoid these situations. However, some of these readmission agreements 
have been criticized for not including sufficient provisions to protect the human rights of 
the returnees.
171
 
 
Norway has signed readmission agreements with 29 countries where 20 of these are outside 
the Schengen area.
172
 The Standard Draft Agreement between the EU and third countries 
will often provide the basis for negotiations of bilateral agreements since Norway cooper-
ate closely with EU on migration control. Norway has only one agreement which includes 
UNHCR. This is the tripartite agreement with Afghanistan, where IOM is responsible for 
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the reintegration program in connection with the agreement.
173
 However another example 
will be highlighted here, precisely because there has been debate about this agreement, both 
within Norway, and with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. 
 
A letter was sent by the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants to the Ministry 
of Justice and Public Security, asking questions about the readmission agreement signed 
with Ethiopia in 2012. Question number four is particularly interesting, where the Special 
Rapporteur asks: “How will your Excellency’s Government ensure that the authorities in 
Ethiopia comply with the absolute prohibition of torture vis-à-vis the returnee?”174 The 
Ministry replied that at the stage where return is prepared for by Norwegian authorities, the 
protection claim of the returnee has been thoroughly processed by UDI and UNE. Persons 
at risk of persecution, death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, are granted asylum. Further, the letter states that under no circumstances may 
such persons be returned to the country of origin. Information about the country of origin 
was highlighted as a vital tool to ensure that the decision is made correctly.
175
 However it 
might still be asked questions on whether this information is good enough when it comes to 
reaction upon return, referring to discussions on knowledge about life after return in this 
thesis. Although, the arguments made by the Ministry are important because it seems that 
the readmission agreement are not meant to ensure legal safeguards for persons in need of 
protection in the line of reasoning presented in the letter. Though, in other circumstances it 
seems that these agreements have been used to make legal safeguards. 
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5.1.4.1 The legal appearance of readmission agreements 
In 2008, the ECtHR laid out major principles to guide the assessment of diplomatic assur-
ances against ill-treatment on a case-by-case basis.
176
 The Court further stated that even 
where the receiving state provides assurances satisfying the sending state, the ECtHR has 
the obligation to examine whether such assurances provided, in their practical application, 
a sufficient guarantee that the individual to be transferred would be protected against the 
risk of treatment prohibited by the ECHR.
177
 Accordingly, the weight to be given to assur-
ances from the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances obtaining at the 
material time.
178
 In effect, this means that readmission agreements may have a role to play 
in ensuring legal safeguards depending on the circumstances in each case.  
 
Manfred Novak, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, came with a note to the 
General Assembly of UN in 2005. He argued that diplomatic assurances are unreliable and 
ineffective in the protection against torture and ill-treatment in general. Further Novak stat-
ed that such assurances are usually sought from states where the practice of torture is sys-
tematic, and the post-return monitoring mechanisms have proven to be no guarantee against 
torture.
179
 One example of a post-return monitoring mechanism can be found in the case of 
Othman v. UK from the ECtHR. Omar Othman, the applicant, alleged that he would be in 
real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR if he were deported to Jordan. 
The readmission agreement, between UK and Jordan in this case made provisions for any 
person returned under it to contact, and have prompt and regular visits from a representa-
tive of an independent body nominated jointly by the UK and Jordanian government. 
Adaleh Center for Human Rights Studies signed a monitoring agreement with the UK in 
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2006.
180
 There was no guarantee that access to the applicant would always be granted to 
Adaleh Center, but it was argued that any refusal would be brought to light quite quickly. 
In the early period of detention, Adaleh Center was expected to visit the applicant three 
times a week, to ensure the safety of the returnee.
181
 Third party comments were received 
by NGOs in this case, and in their view, the Adaleh Center had not carried out any inspec-
tions, nor had the Center expressed any concern of ill-treatment in Jordanian detention fa-
cilities privately or publicly.
182
 However, despite the criticism to the monitoring mecha-
nism in this case, the Court concluded that the applicant’s return to Jordan would not ex-
pose him to a real risk of ill-treatment.
183
 It is important to note that despite its limitations, 
the Court held that the Adaleh Center would be capable of verifying that the assurances 
were respected.
184
  
 
Though, going back to Novak’s note, he argued that diplomatic assurances are not legally 
binding; they therefore carry no legal effect nor accountability if breached, and the person 
whom the assurance aim to protect has no access to remedy if the assurances are violat-
ed.
185
 However, the ECtHR seems to rule differently in the case of Othman v. UK, where it 
in this particular case, argues that the existence of the readmission agreement will make 
possible a return which otherwise could have violated the principle of non-refoulement. 
 
However, the case of Othman v. UK shows that the Special Immigration Appeals Commis-
sion in UK has made a test to see whether diplomatic assurances are sufficient on its own. 
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission did for example find assurances to be insuf-
ficient in respect of Libya in 2007, given the nature of the Gaddafi regime ruling at that 
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time.
186
 The ECtHR has also made a test to assess, first the quality of the assurances given 
and second, whether in light of the receiving state’s practices they can be relied upon.187 
Even though such tests are made, the readmission agreement cannot be a substitute for a 
lack of hard law protection. Novak concludes in his note that states cannot resort to diplo-
matic assurances as a safeguard against torture and ill-treatment where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture or ill-
treatment upon return.
188
 A readmission agreement can be helpful to sort out practicalities 
with the return, but it should not be used as a legal safeguard for the rights of the returnee 
in the post-return phase.  
5.2 Best practice 
In any policy area, it is useful to share and learn from other areas where there has been suc-
cess. One such example can be found in the agreements made due to the Norwegian partic-
ipation in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. The 
issue at hand is that any Afghan citizen apprehended by Norwegian ISAF personnel were 
handed over to the Afghan authorities in accordance with a Memorandum of Understand-
ing (MoU), obliging the Afghan Government to comply with relevant international stand-
ards in the treatment of any persons transferred.
189
  
5.2.1 The transfer of prisoners 
Amnesty International Norway argued in 2007, that there is a great risk that prisoners 
handed over by ISAF forces are subjected to torture and other inhuman treatment in Af-
ghan custody. Amnesty International published a report the same year, demanding that all 
countries contributing to ISAF forces stops handing over prisoners to Afghan authorities. 
ISAF forces generally delivered prisoners to the National Directorate for Security. A Cana-
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dian journalist documented that prisoners handed over by Canadian ISAF forces was se-
verely ill-treated in prisons run by the National Directorate for Security. Moreover Amnes-
ty in Norway reacted to the reluctance from the Norwegian government to give Amnesty 
information about the Afghan prisoners. Further, in April 2007 Norwegian diplomats in 
Kabul raised their concern over the limited access Afghan authorities provides to the follow 
up mechanisms, and that they feared that prisoners were subjected to torture.
190
 The Minis-
ter of Defense in 2007 admitted that Norwegian authorities were concerned about the Af-
ghan National Directorate for Security’s obligations and commitments. She also admitted 
that resources were inadequate for the body that Norway trusted to ensure the monitoring 
of the treatment of prisoners, the Afghan Human Rights Commission.
191
  
 
In its conclusions and recommendations to Norway, considering its fifth periodic report in 
2008, the CAT Committee commented on this issue. The Committee confirmed that article 
3 of the CAT and its obligation of non-refoulement applies to a state party’s military forc-
es, wherever situated, where they exercise effective control over an individual. The CAT 
Committee further argued that the state should continue to closely monitor the compliance 
by the Afghan authorities with their relevant obligations in relation to the continued deten-
tion of any persons handed over by Norwegian military personnel.
192
 
 
In October 2010 the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) – Norway, sent an email to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raising their concerns on whether the principle of non-
refoulement was respected by the Norwegian ISAF forces. Additionally, they asked if there 
were any mechanisms available for the future that could prevent such uncertainty on 
whether the principle was violated or not.
193
 Secretary of State Roger Ingebrigtsen came 
with a public statement 31 October 2010 as a response to ICJ – Norway and other actors 
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that had reacted to the situation with Afghan prisoners. His main argument was that Nor-
wegian forces rarely took prisoners. Although, if it happened, they would actively follow 
up on their situation to ensure the legal protection of the detainees. Norwegian forces oper-
ated primarily with Afghan security forces. Arrests in these operations undertaken by the 
Afghan National Army and Police, as opposed to individuals arrested by Norwegian forces, 
were considered as detained by Afghan authorities. Ingebrigtsen further confirmed that 
Norwegian forces had arrested and handed over 29 persons to Afghan authorities, were 
only three of them were detained. These were followed up actively by established proce-
dures to safeguard their legal rights. Their names and place of imprisonment were reported 
to the International Committee of Red Cross in Kabul and the Afghan Independent Human 
Rights Commission. Additionally, the detainees were visited at least once a year by a doc-
tor and a lawyer from the Norwegian forces, as well as the Norwegian military police. Last-
ly he argued that the monitoring responsibility and the opportunity Norway had to super-
vise prisoners arrested by Norwegian forces should not be confused with the criminal juris-
diction over those individuals. The Afghan authorities are responsible for maintaining law 
and order in their own country.
194
  
 
However, after United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) published a 
report in 2011 on the treatment of conflict related detainees in Afghan custody, the Norwe-
gian government changed their policies. The report’s conclusion stated that torture is prac-
ticed systematically in a number of facilities run by the National Directorate for Security 
throughout Afghanistan.
195
 The Minister of Defense at the time, Grete Faremo, argued that 
although the report did not identify systematic torture in those areas where Norwegian 
forces operated, she decided that the Norwegian forces would stop all transfers of detainees 
to Afghan authorities. She further argued that the transfer of prisoners would not resume 
until there had been a thorough assessment of the situation, and assurance had been made 
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that prisoners handed over by Norwegian forces are not exposed to a real risk of torture 
after the transfer.
196
 
 
Although, the Norwegian ISAF forces started to transfer prisoners to Afghan authorities in 
2012, after a one year stop. Norwegian newspapers wrote that this happened due to the sit-
uation of especially two prisoners. These two were handed over by the Norwegian ISAF 
forces before they stopped transferring prisoners. A lawyer and one of the doctors from the 
Norwegian forces were able to visit them after the Afghan authorities could tell where they 
were in 2012, after being missing from the Norwegian radar. It was then verified that they 
had not been subjected to torture. Thereafter, Espen Barth Eide, the Minister of Defense, 
abolished the prohibition to transfer prisoners to Afghan authorities.
197
 This example is 
referred to as best practice due to several factors, which will be looked at now.   
5.2.2 Lessons that could be learned 
When the Norwegian government learned that they could not monitor properly and that 
they were not accountable for their actions as required under international law – the Nor-
wegian government stopped transferring prisoners to Afghan authorities. They did this de-
spite the existence of a MoU ensuring the rights of the prisoners and the access to infor-
mation about them. This is an important factor, especially since the Norwegian government 
is focusing on making readmission agreements to enable PU to increase the number of 
forced returns every year. It seems that making readmission agreements is a part of the in-
tensified effort to return more persons from Norway. However, it is important that these 
agreements are not taken as an instrument safeguarding the rights of the returnees. The ex-
ample of transferring prisoners shows the possible weakness of such an agreement. Even 
though there were monitoring mechanisms in place, the monitoring body did not have the 
resources needed to follow up the prisoners, and the Norwegian diplomats did not receive 
the access that was agreed on in the MoU. Diplomatic assurances in the shape of a MoU in 
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this case, may be a useful tool for setting out the practicalities of a transfer, but even here it 
may fail.   
 
The concern about ill-treatment of the prisoners was first raised in 2007; however it would 
take four years until the practice would stop. The question is therefore why the state 
stopped the transfer in 2011. Was the pressure from the civil society too high for the state 
to handle? High pressure from powerful organizations such as Amnesty and UN affiliated 
organizations was probably one of the reasons. Another reason could be that in 2011 re-
search results were presented, giving a concrete number of how often torture was found in 
prisons in Afghanistan. UNAMA had conducted interviews with 379 prisoners in 47 pris-
ons in Afghanistan. 46% of those interviewed reported that they had been tortured during 
interrogation.
198
 Arguably, more research should be initiated on the post-return phase for 
forcibly returned asylum seekers. Not knowing can mean that rights are violated. However 
it can also mean that rights are protected. Surely it is argued here that the information 
which can tell whether a right is violated or not, should be desirable. In the case of the 
transfer of prisoners, knowledge about the situation stopped the transfer because the statis-
tics created an uncertainty on whether the duties of the state where upheld. On the other 
hand, knowledge about the situation of two prisoners also created the opportunity for the 
state to start transferring prisoners again, one year later. The lesson that could be learned 
from this is that gaining more knowledge about a situation will help to safeguard the legal 
protection by the state, and make sure that the mechanisms in place are good enough to 
ensure the protection of failed asylum seekers.  
 
After looking at these factors, one ought to ask if anything had changed from 2011 until 
2012. Was the prisoners transferred to a different prison? Had the ill-treatment in Afghan 
prisons stopped because of international pressure? Probably, not much had changed about 
the situation in Afghan prisons. Although, the Norwegian government did confirm that the 
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two prisoners, handed over by Norwegian ISAF forces, had not been ill-treated during the 
time they had been missing from the Norwegian monitoring mechanisms. This was the 
knowledge, and the change that was needed for the Norwegian government to make the 
decision to start transferring prisoners again.  
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6 Conclusion 
This thesis explored the responsibilities of the Norwegian government towards failed 
asylum seekers who are forcefully returned. Whether these responsibilities ensure the 
protection of the failed asylum seeker or not, was found neither in the positive nor the 
negative, due to a lack of information about the effects of the return. It has, however, 
become apparent that the government can do more to protect failed asylum seekers.  
 
There do nonetheless exist several challenges when it comes to the protection of failed 
asylum seekers. It is argued here that the threshold for an article 3 case in the ECtHR has 
been set too high. Additionally, further attention should be given to the practice of applying 
a higher threshold for non-refoulement cases as compared to domestic cases under article 3 
of the ECHR. The Norwegian asylum system can however decide to set a lower threshold 
than what has been set by the ECtHR.  
 
It has furthermore been argued that there exists an extraterritorial obligation to investigate 
allegations of ill-treatment in the post-return phase. Several dilemmas and challenges 
present itself in this phase, lack of knowledge being one of them, another being the lack of 
priority displayed by the political government in Norway. Additionally it seems that the 
mechanisms put in place function more as a ‘warning’ sign, than actual protection of the 
returnee in the post-return phase. Yet, it is crucial to also highlight the proficiency of the 
Norwegian asylum system, even though there is potential for improvement when it comes 
to the protection of failed asylum seekers.    
 
There are many concerns which have not been addressed in this thesis. It has been argued 
that the state should increase its focus on failed asylum seekers and its effort to protect 
them. Future research projects should take on this task and suggest ways to do this in an 
effective and efficient manner.   
 
The hope behind this study is that the failed asylum seeker will be in sight and in mind of 
the Norwegian government in the future. 
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